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Corporate Brand Strategy Formation: Brand Actors and the Situational Context for a 
Business-to-Business Brand 
 
Abstract  
Prior literature on corporate branding in the business-to-business (B2B) context fails to 
provide insight into the dynamics of corporate brand strategy formation, despite the critical 
need for industrial organizations to move beyond a traditional understanding of brands. This 
article examines the corporate brand strategy formation of a European-based industrial 
organization by drawing on strategy-as-practice research and thereby identifying the brand 
actors who participate in corporate brand strategy formation, the construction of 
manifestations that subject the brand values to experience, and the situational context—all 
within a single, ongoing, recursive interaction process.  
 
Keywords: business-to-business brands, corporate brand strategy formation, corporate brand 
strategy manifestations, brand values, brand actors, situational context, social interactions. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate branding’s relevance in the business-to-business (B2B) context is increasing as 
industrial marketers focus on building their brand(s) at the corporate level (Beverland, Napoli, 
& Lindgreen, 2007; Glynn, 2010; Kuhn, Alpert, & Pope, 2008; Low & Blois, 2002). 
Successful branding at this level requires corporate brand values to become the organization’s 
“central organising thought” (Macrae, 1999: 8) and a filter that guides employee behavior 
(Keller, 2003). Existing research notes the resultant need to communicate not only a product’s 
price and functional features (Bendixen, Bukasa, & Abratt, 2004; Mitchell, King, & Reast, 
2001) but also its salient intangible associations, such as expertise and trustworthiness 
(Beverland & Lindgreen, 2002; Glynn, 2010; Mudambi, 2002; Persson, 2010; Webster & 
Keller, 2004). Such communication should originate with employees and spread through 
relevant customer touch points (Mudambi, 2002; Persson, 2010; Webster & Keller, 2004); to 
ensure such paths, corporate brand values
4
 must adopt generalized meanings within the 
organization. 
The strong corporate brand that can result from this process has significant benefits in 
various contexts, including mergers and acquisitions (Lambkin & Muzellec, 2010) and 
manufacturer–reseller relationships (Glynn, 2010). Yet the dynamics of the branding 
processes remain unclear. First, to our knowledge, no existing research examines the brand 
actors involved, that is, the people who participate in branding (Mühlbacher & Hemetsberger, 
2008). Although leaders have been identified clearly as critical drivers (Vallaster & de 
Chernatony, 2006; Lindgreen, Maon, Xu, & Wilcock, 2011), the role of other actors, both 
internally and externally, has not been addressed. Second, the impact of each actor’s social 
interactions in branding has not been considered. For instance, only little research has 
addressed the mechanisms through which such interactions take place, for example meetings 
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as a way to develop branding strategies (de Chernatony, Drury, & Segal-Horn, 2006). Third, 
research examining brand-supportive behavior shows that personal interest influences actors’ 
choices of brand practices (Burmann & Zeplin, 2005; Thomson, de Chernatony, Arganbright, 
& Khan, 1999), but the question of how situational (i.e., individual, organizational, or market-
related) contexts influence brand strategy formation remains unanswered. For instance, 
individual-related context such as motivation (“what’s in for me?”) greatly determines the 
degree to which an employee is likely to engage in brand strategy formation. With regard to 
organizational-related context, different divisions or sub-units of an organization may follow 
different goals, which in turn may determine the priority with which an overall brand strategy 
is followed. Finally, market-related context refers to the way that satisfying customer (or other 
stakeholder) needs, or competitive moves, may influence brand strategy formation.  
In particular, there is “little research ... on key strategic and tactical issues in relation to 
building, managing, and refreshing business brands” (Lindgreen, Beverland, & Farrelly, 
2010: 1223–24). Efforts increasingly focus on the brand itself and related economical aspects; 
however, if researchers are to help practitioners formulate more effective brand strategies, we 
first need a deeper understanding of what practitioners actually do.  
Therefore, we draw on the ideas promoted in strategy-as-practice research (Chia, 2003; 
Hendry, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Johnson, Langley, 
Melin, & Whittington, 2007; Whittington, 2003) to illuminate branding processes by 
distinguishing among the practice lens (brand strategy as situationally and socially 
accomplished), brand practices (actual activities by the organization), and brand practitioners 
(skilled actors involved in brand strategy making) (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Maitlis, 2005; 
Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Rouleau, 2005; Whittington, 2006). For the purpose of this study, 
we define brand strategy formation as a process and consider both simultaneous and 
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reciprocal attempts to influence corporate brand understandings and generate shared brand 
meanings.  
To contribute to literature on how B2B brand actors participate in the interactive space of 
brand strategy formation, we highlight situational elements and address two key research 
questions. First, what role do company internal and external brand actors play when 
participating in brand strategy formation? Second, how does the situational context drive 
brand strategy formation and thus help establish a strong corporate B2B brand?  
We structure the remainder of this article as follows: First, we review challenges in brand 
strategy formation in a B2B context and thereby describe brand strategy formation by (1) 
defining corporate brand and brand values, (2) identifying brand actors and their social 
interactive mechanisms, (3) outlining brand strategy formation practices, and (4) analyzing 
the influence of the situational context on brand strategy formation. Second, we detail the 
qualitative case study we employ in this article. Third, we present and discuss our research 
findings. Fourth and finally, we identify the study’s theoretical and managerial contributions, 
as well as some limitations and avenues for further research. 
2. Literature review 
Corporate brand strategy formation is a complex process. For B2B organizations to 
coordinate the various activities of their organizational brand actors and influence social 
interactions between the organization and its stakeholders, they need an in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics that shape their brand strategy formation (Lindgreen, 
Beverland, & Farrelly, 2010).   
2.1. Corporate brands and brand values  
Corporate branding applies a single brand across the entire organization; the corporate culture 
becomes the very foundation of the corporate brand (Hatch & Schultz 2001, 2003). To define 
fundamentally what an organization is, the corporate culture must encompass corporate values 
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(Balmer & Wilson, 1998; Van de Veen, 2008). Such values are necessary to an organization, 
but a corporate brand also is contingent on the promise made to external stakeholders (Balmer 
& Grey, 2003). In this sense, a corporate brand involves values that distinguish it from 
competitors, assuming those values are congruent with the corporate culture. For example, the 
Liechtenstein-based power tool company Hilti promises it will “Outperform. Outlast,” and its 
corporate cultural values mirror this concept (e.g., to act with integrity, demonstrate courage 
to go beyond its habits, outperform through teamwork, commit to personal and organizational 
growth). To develop a consistent brand image, Hilti must make all these ‘brand values’ 
explicit to its stakeholders, who then ascribe meaning to the organization—ideally, congruent 
with the corporate culture—as a result of their brand experiences (Hatch & Schultz, 2001, 
2003; Schultz, Hatch, Larsen, & Van Riel, 2002).   
2.2. Brand actors and the social interactive mechanism of brand strategy formation   
Brand management literature often focuses on the contributions of the CEO or top 
management team in influencing what the branding strategy means, how it is enacted, and 
how its associated processes might be managed (Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 2000; Davis & 
Dunn, 2002; Vallaster & de Chernatony, 2006). However, leaders are not the only actors who 
give sense to employees (Mintzberg & Raisinghani, 1976; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). For 
example, industrial marketers need a “bottom up and top down approach to brand building” 
(Webster & Keller, 2004: 398) and actively engage employees in the brand building process. 
Thus middle managers—who mediate between the organization’s internal and external 
environments—strongly influence brand-related processes (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; 
Schilit, 1987; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990). Adopting a sense-giving and sense-making 
perspective for the analysis of brand strategy formation results in seeing such processes as an 
interactive process (Laroche, 1995) that consists of conversational and interaction practices 
such as workshops, events, or away-days (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). These practices feature 
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participants from inside and outside an organization who show varying degrees of intention, 
interest, and intensity (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003).  
Most current literature cites three main brand actors: managers who drive the branding 
strategy (Keller, 2003); consumers who use, alter, or reject brand meanings (Kates, 2004); and 
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, shareholders, various regulators, and local 
communities, that create and develop brand meaning (e.g., Hatch & Shultz, 2003). Little 
branding research, especially in a B2B context, explores and describes their interactions. For 
example, are corporate brands predominantly constructed internally, externally, or in 
cooperation (Roper & Davies, 2007)? Recent research in the Trappist beer industry suggests 
that “brand meaning is not the sole province of marketers but also draws on the institutional 
environment surrounding the brand” (Lindgreen & Beverland, 2009: 81). The development of 
each Trappist brand thus results from complex interplays among brand managers (i.e., 
individual or organizational), the institutional (i.e., market) environment, business buyers (i.e., 
individual or organizational), and consumers (i.e., individual).  
To the best of our knowledge, no research defines clearly how various actors—such as 
employees from different organizational divisions, external partners, and customers—who are 
embedded in branding strategy formation actually come to agree on its manifestation 
(Mühlbacher & Hemetsberger, 2008). By brand manifestation we mean tangible and 
intangible objectifications of the meaning of a brand. For instance, the Hilti brand is 
manifested in various way (i.e., through its products, staff behaviour, and communication). 
Hence, brand manifestations allow employees and other stakeholder groups to experience the 
meaning of a brand (Mühlbacher & Hemetsberger, 2008). Examining the issue of brand 
manifestation agreement represents a response to calls for a deeper understanding of brand 
development and maintenance (Lindgreen & Beverland, 2009). 
2.3. Situational context of brand strategy formation: individual context and beyond 
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If employees know the brand values and consider them relevant, they may start to identify 
with the brand and behave accordingly (Burmann & Zeplin, 2005). Contemporary strategy 
research thus proposes conceptualizing strategically relevant (branding) cognitions as 
schemata (Rouleau, 2005) or “accounts” (Maitlis, 2005) that construct a stepwise view of 
ongoing strategy formation. Thus brand strategy formation occurs in the movement from one 
schema to the next. At any point in time, individual schemata “constitute a mix between old 
schemata that have not been challenged, schemata in the process of transition, and schemata 
that have already been changed” (Balogun & Johnson, 2005: 1588). This conceptualization 
cannot explain though how context-dependent (situational) individual brand constructions 
exist in conflict with socially accepted (situation-independent) brand constructions (cf. Garud 
& Rappa, 1994). For example, employees might agree with and be highly committed to 
strategic branding projects overall, but they probably have differing opinions when it comes 
to the changes required for their own business units. Even if people hold different viewpoints, 
they can collaborate effectively during strategy making (Eden & Ackermann, 1998; Mezias, 
Grinyer, & Guth, 2001; Van der Heijden & Eden, 1998); they also demonstrate idiosyncratic 
beliefs when they consider intentional non-adherence (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993; 
Thomas, Shankster, & Mathieu, 1994). Intentional actions appear in traditional research into 
observable strategy formation processes, though Mintzberg (1995) also highlights 
unintentional facets of strategy making, in which the brand strategy emerges over time as 
intentions collide with and accommodate the changing reality.  
Thus to advance knowledge about brand strategy formation, we need a better 
understanding of social interactions across interested individuals, groups, and organizations, 
both internal and external to the focal firm. We also pick up the perspective that brand 
strategy formation may happen in two ways, that is in intentional and unintentional ways. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Case study and case company  
We adopt a case study method (Yin, 2003), which focuses on understanding dynamics in 
specific settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Woodside, 2010). To define the unit of analysis, we apply 
Yin’s (2003) criteria: (1) It must relate clearly to the main research question; (2) it should 
represent an extreme case; and (3) it is possible to delineate the unit of analysis clearly. The 
European company HighRingTech,
5
 an internationally oriented, family-owned organization, 
meets all these criteria. This firm, about 150 years old, sells a broad range of industrial 
products such as vibration control components, nonwovens, and household cleaning products. 
Figure 1 illustrates the organizational structure of the business segment that we analyzed, 
namely, business area A, which comprises three business groups: Vibration Control Europe, 
Vibration Control America, and Vibratech Europe. In total, the unit employed approximately 
20,000 employees at the time of our investigation. 
{Insert Figure 1 around here} 
Since the mid-1990s, HighRingTech has officially cited five brand values and guiding 
principles for daily behavior: innovation, leadership, people, responsibility, and long-term 
orientation. In early 2002, it added one more brand value: value for customer. The company 
believed that being passionately committed to anticipating, understanding, and meeting 
customers’ needs and expectations empowers their customers to be successful. Their global 
presence is believed to provide the company with a competitive advantage.  
Yet HighRingTech began as a technologically oriented culture, which meant it had 
significant work to do to ensure a positive customer experience. In particular, according to its 
chair, 
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Due to our historic roots we had—and partly still have—a fiddling culture: a great 
majority of our staff has a technically-oriented background; we were always highly 
innovative and put about 6% into our research and development program. However, it 
could happen that we developed products that customers did not accept. It was, 
therefore, not surprising that we were not perceived as an innovative company as we 
lost touch with reality. 
HighRingTech’s major weakness was that it ignored customers’ needs and failed to listen to 
what customers told them. The director of sales reported some common business practices:  
When we visited our customers and we had an hour to present our products, we took 
information material for two hours with us. We actually tended to plaster our 
customers with information and we did not ask them for their opinion. We simply did 
not care. 
A customer satisfaction analysis, conducted between 1995 and 2001, always provided the 
same results: The Vibration Control segment was losing its dominant position. In response, 
HighRingTech introduced its “Ultimate Customer Orientation” (UCO) initiative in early 
2002, designed to be an ongoing effort that would use customer satisfaction reviews as 
measures of improvement.  
3.2. Research methods 
To gain a description of the UCO initiative, the first author conducted interviews with 20 
employees, focusing particularly on marketing managers and members of the brand team 
responsible for global brand management, as well as the employees of external partners (e.g., 
consulting agency, suppliers, market research company). The selection of interviewees 
reflected their involvement in the UCO program, such that we pursued a good balance 
between active
6
 and passive
7
 participants, as we detail in Table 1.  
{Insert Table 1 around here}  
Each interview lasted an average of two hours. The first author also visited each case site and 
gathered additional information from conversations, observations, and other in situ 
techniques. Prior to each interview, publicly available secondary data and promotional 
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regards to progress and success of the program. 
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information provided by the company and external agencies were reviewed to gain greater 
familiarity with the case.  
The interview questions focused on gathering a descriptive history of the motivation to 
focus on the customer, associated pressures, major objections, relationships with other brand 
values, support (or lack thereof) for brand strategy implementation, and levels of success, as 
well as the determinants of this performance. The interviews started with broad, “grand tour” 
questions that enabled the informants to present the material in their own terms. These 
questions appeared interspersed with specific prompts designed to induce greater insights into 
specific lines of inquiry, such as details about particular programs. Although a short, 
standardized guide was used for each interview, our data gathering also reflected emerging 
topics that appeared in any interviews. We detail the interview guidelines in Table 2. 
{Insert Table 2 around here}  
After the interviews, we analyzed any further information provided by the informants or 
other sources. By drawing on secondary data and multiple interviews with different company 
stakeholder groups, including customers and external agencies, we develop rich insights and 
support the transferability of our findings to other contexts (Eisenhardt, 1991).  
3.3. Data analysis 
We first analyzed the case to gain a richer understanding of the brand strategy formation that 
HighRingTech undertook. We aimed to identify brand actors participating throughout the 
process, formal and informal processes of social interaction, branding practices, and 
situational contexts. Simultaneously, we elaborated on theoretical categories using open, 
axial, and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). For the open coding process, we read 
and examined discrete parts of the interview transcripts to identify similarities and 
differences. Each author performed this analysis independently and classified each interview 
section according to an initial coding scheme that comprised social interactions applied, 
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branding practices taken, and brand actors. The authors then met to discuss and reach 
agreement on any portions of the analysis subject to disagreement.  
With axial coding, we reassembled the data into categories and subcategories to reveal the 
role of the situational context on the brand strategy formation process. For example, due to 
their unique and often particular characteristics, different people within the company tended 
to focus on specific issues that they believed were the most appropriate and relevant. Their 
beliefs about what constitutes a branded organization depended on their perspective. Yet 
people’s expectations are not only inconsistent (Dawson, 2003) but also inexorably evolve 
over time (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), so brand strategy formation requires constant 
reassessments and dialogue between the organization and its brand actors. Our first brand 
strategy formation code therefore consists of various internal (e.g., CEO, communication, 
production, marketing) and external (e.g., customers, consultancy agency) brand actors.  
Finally, to gain a holistic, contextualized comprehension of how the company approaches 
its aim of becoming more customer oriented, we tacked back and forth between prior 
literature and our data to develop several theoretical categories (Spiggle, 1994). For example, 
our analysis revealed that different stakeholders play different roles in brand strategy 
formation. To understand these shifts, we consulted extant literature. 
Throughout the study, we also adopted several methods to ensure quality. Consistent with 
recommendations from interpretive researchers (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), grounded theorists 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and previous case-based research (Beverland & Lindgreen, 2010), 
we applied credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, integrity, fit, 
understanding, generality, and control criteria. In particular, we conducted multiple 
interviews, established our own independent interpretations of the findings, and allowed 
respondents to provide feedback on our initial findings. All interviews were conducted by the 
first author, and additional colleagues performed the independent coding of the transcripts, 
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which reduced the potential for bias (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Strauss & Corbin, 1998), as we 
detail in Table 3. 
{Insert Table 3 around here}  
4. Research findings 
In structuring this section, we first describe the starting point for brand strategy formation, 
then identify the brand actors and the social interactions that characterized the brand strategy 
formation. We also describe brand strategy formation practices. We conclude by describing 
the influence of situational contexts on brand strategy formation.  
4.1. Starting point and employee reactions  
In September 2001, the management team of HighRingTech awaited, with increasing tension, 
the results of a customer satisfaction survey. An external market research agency, responsible 
for conducting customer research on a regular two-year basis, presented the results: For the 
third consecutive time, the organization’s performance had fallen in comparison with that of 
its competitors. The audience reaction was mixed, ranging from true consternation to 
frustrated utterances of “Yeah, right, no wonder if the wrong people are being asked,” “the 
results are not worth the paper it is written on,” and “I can’t see these results mirroring my 
area’s performance.” Many of the employees were simply shocked when confronted with the 
negative assessments customers offered of their experiences, but the chair of the board made 
one point very clear:  
We have to move! These results are disastrous. We are being rated worse almost on all 
items if compared to our competitors. We can no longer afford to lose any more 
market share. And I am sick of talking against the wall: Despite communicating the 
results of the survey from the last two years on a very regular basis and many 
meetings with the responsible people, nothing happened. It seems that the impact was 
zero. If we want to succeed in the future, we need to go through a major branding 
program. 
Soon after the release of these disastrous results, HighRingTech decided to roll out a 
program called “Customer Orientation First” (UCO). The organization introduced three 
corporate-wide initiatives, each of which we discuss in subsequent sections:  
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 Internal actions, for example official documentation, UCO logo and principles, 
communication, and awards (see section 4.2.2).  
 External actions to intensify customer relationships, including reworking logistics, 
complaint, and innovation-led processes, for example translation of customer 
requirements into processes and activities, development of collaborative 
interdepartmental relationships, and documenting customer-specific roadmaps (see 
section 4.3). 
 Training under the heading “value selling,” for example change agents and brand 
champions (see section 4.2.1)  
These activities aimed to anchor the meaning of UCO (i.e., anticipate, understand, and meet 
customers’ needs and expectations) in HighRingTech’s organizational culture and thus to 
facilitate changes to the rather technologically oriented mindset of employees, moving them 
toward a more customer-oriented corporate brand. At the outset, HighRingTech management 
set a target score of 8.0 for overall customer satisfaction (on a 10-point scale), to be achieved 
by all business groups by 2003. Their average satisfaction score in 2001 was 7.2, so this target 
was considered ambitious. 
4.2. Brand actors and social interactions  
4.2.1. Brand leadership practices at all levels  
The official support provided by top management at the start of the UCO initiative seemed to 
be a crucial success factor that signaled the importance of delivering more value to the 
customer. However, accepting the role of change agent was tough, as the chair reported: 
You need to be the first to change, you need to be very clear of the goal and what your 
next steps are, you need to take tough questions, you need to be tough yourself but 
listen to your employees’ problems at the same time, you need to be visible for your 
own people and at the customers’ site, and you need to be patient as changes are long-
distance races. 
Brand strategy formation was unlikely to succeed as a one-person show; the demand for 
strong leadership thus required effort at all levels of the organization (Ind, 2007; LePla & 
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Parker, 1999). To address this issue, the company extended its top and middle management 
and added new members without nostalgia for the former strategy. To help transfer UCO 
principles throughout the organizational hierarchy, about 20 managers from all levels (Figure 
2) were tagged to act as champions, because their experiences and personalities would enable 
them to promote an agreed value system based on a commitment to increase customer 
satisfaction, collaboration, professional development, and mentoring, as well as performance 
in accordance with the organization’s standards and culture.  
{Insert Figure 2 around here} 
In a first step, these brand champions received introductions to the UCO philosophy. Their 
task was to develop ideas for training that would be needed to disseminate the strategic brand 
goal of selling customer solution packages rather than individual products. In two workshops, 
mediated by external consultants, HighRingTech gathered these ideas and decided how to 
launch “Value-selling training.” The primary message was in accordance with the brand 
value, “customer orientation first,” and it emphasized that the higher selling price for the 
solution package ultimately would mean lower costs for customers. Salespeople, technical 
engineers, marketers, leaders, and middle and senior managers (including the chair) learned 
how to translate the immediate benefits that a product delivered into dollars-and-cents 
financial impacts for customer, then reveal how higher priced but differentiated products 
would cost less than those offered by competitors. Another part of the agenda was ensuring 
accurate training and preparation for customer visits and interviews, including ways to listen 
to customers and ask the right questions.  
More than 100 employees underwent the initial training session organized by the external 
consultants and received certificates that qualified them to conduct similar training sessions. 
Ultimately more than 500 training sessions, with roughly 8,000 employees, took place; the 
educational materials also were translated into 35 languages.  
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4.2.2. Communication practices revisited: communicating importance of brand strategy 
formation 
To make the customer more visible—not only in in-house media but in offices and at the 
production site—HighRingTech needed to revise its regular communication practices. This 
shift required the strong involvement of the human resources and communications department 
(Aurand, Gorchels, & Bishop, 2005). The chair summarized the challenges:  
You need to touch base with thousands of people, telling them why it is important to 
change. People have to understand the essentials of UCO and that we will be more 
successful by doing that.  
This challenge particularly emerged with regard to communicating the importance and 
meaning of the brand strategy formation to different people with different mindsets (Aaker & 
Joachimsthaler, 2000; de Chernatony, 2010, Salzer-Mörling & Strannegard, 2004). The 
director of sales, who headed the largest business group in the segment, noted:  
It is important to know with whom you are talking to. We needed to target employees 
working at the production lines, with controllers, with sales people, etc. They all hear 
and understand something different when talking about UCO; the degree to which 
they attached importance to that process differed and so was their willingness to 
participate and drive brand strategy formation. 
To minimize potential conflict, the primary decisions focused on whether the internal 
communication campaign would be developed centrally or for different business areas; if it 
were developed centrally, the top management team would need to acknowledge each 
decentralized organizational structure and grant the various business areas significant 
entrepreneurial responsibility. If employees would not join the communication program, the 
entire success of the UCO effort would be at risk. The person responsible for internal 
communication thus reflected:  
After a few discussions, it was decided that the main goals and topics of the UCO 
communication campaign were to be developed with the help of external agencies 
based on our detailed briefing. Our consultants, our Chair, and myself had the final 
say, but the various business areas had quite a lot of freedom in implementing the 
communication strategy. Also, they could count on the help of our PR department that 
supported the roll-out of the communication campaign by providing communication 
material such as posters or flyers. 
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In addition, several practices were identified as central to the success of the internal 
communication program. First, to clarify the purpose of UCO, the company developed an 
official document that listed its main topics and translated it into the seven languages used 
throughout the organization. An external agency also produced the UCO logo. The 
cooperation between this agency and HighRingTech was a dialog-based, give-and-take 
relationship, a consensus opinion among all those involved: 
To make sure they developed a sign that characterizes the UCO efforts, we intensively 
exchanged our ideas, which of course led to some re-definition of some planned UCO 
steps and practices, but in its essence the strategic aim remained the same.  
The use of a single logo and official document helped employees acknowledge and recognize 
the goals of UCO, as well as internalize its principles and become more customer oriented.  
Second, to facilitate communication with and among employees about UCO success steps 
and practices, HighRingTech used both face-to-face and virtual communications. Advanced 
data networks linked the internal teams and enhanced the exchange of UCO knowledge. To 
encourage employees to adopt practices that were particularly successful in one area and 
apply them in their own business fields, the company broadcast over its intranet the “best 
practices” achieved by different departments, with the motto “Steal Shamelessly.” For every 
story posted, the posting department received a green point, assigned by an external 
consultancy company. The first department with five green points earned special credit and 
recognition. As the logistics manager recalled, 
At first, this initiative did not seem to be very fruitful. Months passed and nothing 
happened. Actually, rumors had it that this was an artificially created competition 
amongst departments, facilitated by an external agency—as if we had nothing better to 
do. Then it was our department that posted our first story … and a few months later, 
we posted our second story. We received two green points and everybody could see 
this. Suddenly something strange happened—within two weeks, six other departments 
launched their successful stories and practices and many more followed; a real hype 
was initiated. 
This communication practice seemed to intensify lateral connections and competition across 
functions, because the information was accessible to everyone. 
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Third, success stories, including UCO awards on the sales and business group levels, 
aimed to imprint UCO in people’s memories. To induce employees to talk or write about 
UCO, the company printed and distributed success stories in its in-house newspaper, 
(available in seven languages), which also underwent a complete style and content revision. 
Previously, the focus of the newspaper had been on top management and their actions; in the 
revision, their contributions shrank to just the editorial feature, and employees and customers 
received the bulk of the attention. This content often highlighted how staff members could 
produce a more customer-oriented company, featured customer success stories, or depicted 
customer logos.  
Fourth, cards printed with the UCO principles were distributed to all employees, and 
installed screens and posters at production sites depicted customer-oriented information, such 
as complaints or thank-you letters. The creativity displayed in facilitating social interactions 
knew no bounds; for example, one initiative organized quizzes that tested players’ product 
knowledge. Participants who answered questions about the firm’s products and their locations 
in the customer’s car product correctly could receive that car for a weekend. Smiling face 
images identified strong performance and positive news; newly developed boards showed the 
customer for which the products were being produced. Whereas previously production lines 
took names such as VK 1, 2, or 3, they now received new names that indicated the key 
accounts, such as BMW production, Ford production, and so on.  
4.3. Brand strategy formation practices: translating customer requirements into changed 
processes and operational activities 
In focusing on how to facilitate internal communication practices within the company, as well 
as how different organizational cultures might be integrated to enhance learning, 
HighRingTech launched a program called CIP (“Continuous Improvement Processes”). The 
idea was to translate customer requirements into changed processes and operational activities 
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quickly and effectively, modeled after Japanese "kaizen" projects that pursue steady change 
for the better. In the CIP program, teams from different departments and functions would 
work together for a few days to formulate specific solutions to a very specific problem. This 
approach reflects the recommendations of Homburg, Workman, and Jensen (2000), who 
suggest using groups of customers and their requirements as the primary basis for an 
organizational structure.   
In addition, so-called “common issue teams” were tasked with identifying internal 
problems related to concerns that appeared in the customer satisfaction analysis, such as 
delivery performance, quality defects, or innovation lead times. These teams then worked to 
improve the underlying processes by intensifying and improving relationships with logistics, 
suppliers, and further back in the value chain. The key account manager of one of the biggest 
raw material suppliers to HighRingTech recalled:  
In the initial stages, we—dealing with HighRingTech and knowing their 
technologically-oriented culture—were really skeptical when we learned about their 
efforts in focusing more on their customer needs. First, what is it that we have to do 
with their customers—but then we started to understand that they were really getting 
into it and that we also profit from their better customer-oriented performance. So it 
was really a learning process for both of us. 
Another effect was the development of strong collaborative interdepartmental 
relationships, which enhanced searches for customer solutions and the coordination of 
pertinent information (Workman, Homburg, & Jensen, 2003). The results of this teamwork 
were implemented directly, with their outcomes closely monitored. The teams had wide-
ranging autonomy and decision-making prerogatives, which reflected and underlined the 
company’s basic goal to transfer more responsibility to associates and encourage them to 
make continuous improvements a permanent part of their daily work life.  
Overall, these brand strategy formation practices, designed to intensify customer 
relationships through regular, timely, relevant communications of customer needs and related 
strategies, appeared to have a positive impact on customer value creation. A nearly intimate 
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relationship with customers developed, for which regular customer visits by HighRingTech 
employees from all business areas were considered crucial. Not just sales but also employees 
from product development, quality, and logistics visited customers. To intensify customer 
contacts on all levels and functions, each area developed customer-specific roadmaps. A 
particularly viable connection with customers emerged from efforts to address issues such as 
particular weaknesses and problems mentioned in the customer satisfaction survey, as well as 
discussions of ways to improve the relationship. According to the sales director, such efforts 
were “perceived as something exceptional, as the feedback made our customers feel valued 
and heard.”  
4.4. Understanding the influence of the situational context  
Our analysis revealed that individual, business group–specific/organizational, and market-
related contexts all influenced the brand strategy formation by facilitating or hindering the 
process.   
4.4.1. Individual context: Developing a sense of customer orientation among employees 
Lack of language skills: The first difficulty in expressing the need to develop a more 
customer-oriented culture was that many of the actors simply did not understand the English 
phrase “customer orientation first.” The sales manager (VK 1) reported, “Most of the people 
at the production line don’t speak English. Hence, the phrase ‘Customer Orientation First’ 
was not understood by most of the people—and therefore widely ignored at first.” As a 
response, management renamed the entire initiative using local languages (German, Dutch).  
Lack of motivation: The newly applied internal communication practices were not enough 
to induce sensitivity in employees’ attitudes toward customers though (not to mention their 
behaviors). Much of the information was never read; if read, it was often considered 
incredible or overly hyped by management (Larkin & Larkin, 1996; Lencioni, 2002). To try to 
address this issue, the company invited customers to visit production sites on a more regular 
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basis and illustrate the end product for which the HighRingTech products were used. The 
sales manager (VK 2) remembered his experience: “One of our customers aptly described 
what happened if our product was not manufactured properly—the bus would drive against 
the wall.” These presentations about the importance of delivering high-quality products 
helped enhance the credibility of UCO among workers at the production site.  
Resistance to change: Fatigue in response to “yet another campaign” created another issue. 
The head of the internal communications department explained:  
Being confronted with a new program, many employees think that what they have 
been doing so far was bad. We put a strong focus in emphasizing good examples that 
were already existed … and as time passed and also customers came up with 
rewarding words and statements, we felt that our employees lost their cynicism to a 
great extent. In fact, today employees call the editors and tell them about particular 
customer-oriented solutions. 
4.4.2. Business group–specific/organizational context: Addressing employee resistance to 
customer orientation  
Information flow: Management was aware that the UCO brand strategy formation process 
would be long-term and ongoing, yet it still underestimated the difficulty of communicating 
the guiding principles to some 20,000 employees. Although UCO and its related programs 
overall were considered a success, the degree to which the initiatives were accepted depended 
a lot on the flow of information, enabling the implementation of UCO. According to one 
manager, “the implementation in our business group was too slow – I know from other groups 
that were much quicker, therefore experienced many more quick-wins and therefore had much 
more energy to work on certain issues.” Also, the overuse of virtual media such as the intranet 
led many employees to ignore UCO-related messages. 
Incentive system: Attempts to motivate resistant employees were particularly challenging 
and varied across business groups. The workers’ committee limited any termination of such 
workers, though some business groups attempted to exert pressure through performance 
measures. Yet consequences such as revised reward systems remained an individual issue, 
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and setting goals related to UCO required a personal commitment. The sales director 
explained that “linking customer-oriented behavior to an individual performance system 
would require an additional shift in our corporate culture; we are not there yet although, in my 
opinion, this would be the viable way to go. At the moment, we are setting individual goals 
and exert more informal pressure if you wish to say so; however, this practice varies 
considerably between our business groups.”      
Training offers: Although the training offered was widely considered a good tool for 
enhancing understanding of the UCO content and facilitating employee identification, 
employees hired after 2004 reported that they received no training at all. Asked whether this 
was a specific business group practice, one customer complaint manager noted, “When I had 
my first day in this business group, I was told that I should develop some customer plans—
and that was it. No explanation, no nothing. I know that this introduction varied 
considerably.” Reasons mentioned included possible budget restrictions for training sessions, 
as well as brand champions who often became fatigued, which hindered their advice to 
colleagues.  
4.4.3. Market context: addressing customer orientation through feedback and satisfaction 
Already at the earliest stages, critical statements appeared regarding the items used to measure 
customer satisfaction. For example, in 2002, the director of sales remarked: 
During the past years we have not done anything else than implementing new UCO 
initiatives. And in sum it seems to work—the customers are coming back to us…. And 
yet our company was rated lower on the item Price/Performance ratio if compared to 
main competitors (director of sales). 
Customer feedback: Despite such critical comments, the 2003 customer satisfaction survey 
(i.e., two years after the survey that prompted the UCO initiative) indicated initial success: 
Customers perceived an improvement in customer orientation on almost all items, compared 
with that provided by HighRingTech’s competitors. This achievement also appeared in some 
qualitative statements from customers: 
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The local customer service changed very much. Number and quality of visits are 
outstanding…. The contact persons care more about us than the competition. The 
service is very good (informant A, development division). 
 
Concerning technical know-how and quality of the products I would say that 
HighRingTech is the benchmark for the competition (informant B, purchasing 
division). 
This very positive feedback in turn had a positive impact on employees’ motivation to work 
harder to deliver the value promised to the customer.  
Other stakeholder feedback: The organization of bi-annual customer events, such as Tech 
Days and industry forums, was a viable way to meet customers, supply chain partners, 
consultants and media. Such events allowed the company to gather feedback regarding the 
perceived strengths/weaknesses of the UCO program, to integrate company external UCO 
perspectives into the program, to better understand their needs, and to enhance networking. 
Reflection on customer satisfaction and competitor standing: As of 2010, the customer 
remained at the center of HighRingTech’s brand promise. Satisfaction surveys in 2005, 2007, 
and 2009 showed steady improvement, though the ratings varied somewhat. Some business 
areas reached their target score of 8.0 for overall customer satisfaction, but others lagged 
behind. In automotive sales, overall ratings improved from 7.4 in 2001 to 7.6 in 2003; the 
results for 2005–2009 showed slight further improvement. Even though this group enhanced 
its performance on most criteria (cf. the price–performance ratio), it still earned lower ratings 
than its competitors.  
5. Brand strategy formation, group, and brand manifestations  
In this section, we illustrate how brand strategy formation integrates the people who 
participate in the process, the manifestations that make the brand strategy subject to 
experience, and the situational context associated with this single, ongoing, recursive, 
interactive process. Brand actors, both internal and external to the organization, interact 
socially and produce brand strategy manifestations. Brand strategy knowledge and 
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manifestations are continuously co-created and co-constructed; they also are simultaneously 
implemented, which then influences the ongoing interaction (see Figure 3).   
{Insert Figure 3 around here} 
5.1. Brand strategy formation  
Brand strategy formation constitutes an emerging, complex system of brand knowledge that 
emerges continuously from a strategy-relevant social interaction process. This complex 
system is consensual but not uniform. It consists of both shared (Whittington, 2006) and more 
peripheral elements.  
The core contains the consensual elements shared by all members of the strategy group, 
independent of their specific context (e.g., geographic region, functional area, hierarchical 
level, team membership, decision problem); for HighRingTech, the central goal of becoming 
more customer oriented was generally understood and shared by most employees and 
company partners. This intersubjectivity enables group members to work in a coordinated 
fashion (Eden & Ackermann, 1998; Mezias et al., 2001; Van der Heijden & Eden, 1998). 
Situational-specific knowledge and practices also are distributed across members. These 
peripheral elements allow individual actors to adapt their actions flexibly to operational needs, 
without jeopardizing the core content of the strategy. For HighRingTech, the practices used to 
become more customer oriented differed across departments and encompassed various 
languages, for example. The context-specific brand knowledge of individual members in the 
strategy interest group may overlap, but it also can be contradictory, as demonstrated in the 
critical comments about and challenges associated with brand strategy formation. Yet even 
when employees expressed very different representations of their reality, they widely agreed 
on the way to frame those depictions (Fiol, 1994). Garud and Rappa (1994) call attention to 
the enactment of a belief system over time, which they describe as a process that places 
paradoxical demands on individuals: They must believe in their own realities to make 
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progress in their chosen paths and convince others, but at the same time, they must be ready to 
disbelieve their realities and embrace an emerging shared reality, even if it does not match 
theirs. Therefore, alternative versions of the same brand strategy existed across individuals 
and for each individual. Depending on the specific context, the different versions then get 
activated in memory (Barsalou, 1999).  
The performance measure (i.e., the satisfaction survey) in our case study also reveals that 
despite their socialization, actors participating in ongoing communicative processes adapted 
their brand knowledge and behavior incrementally. Over time, social interaction appears to 
lead to consensus about the meaning of relevant stimuli and appropriate actions. The 
interpretation of branding stimuli thereby becomes socially constructed (Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2000) and grants organizational members a form of orientation. The resulting 
complex system of branding knowledge and feelings, based partly on intentional efforts and 
partly on unintentional ones, continually gets shaped by and shapes the ongoing social 
interaction process. This conceptualization reflects Mezias et al.’s (2001) claim that strategy 
development and implementation are intertwined, such that decisions commit organizations to 
proceed in a certain way, and organizational commitment follows action as much as action 
follows commitment (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). In line with De Wit and Meyer (2003), we 
propose that brand strategies are formed and implemented simultaneously, in intentional and 
unintentional ways.  
5.2. Brand strategy formation group 
Our case reveals that designated, self-interested, and self-selected actors all engage in ongoing 
interactions focused on strategically relevant brand stimuli. Social interaction is a public 
process, in the sense that it is open to all who are interested and feel free and empowered to 
participate. Depending on the organizational structure, the predominant values and norms that 
guide acceptable behavior, the management systems, and the resources and power available to 
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members of the organization and external stakeholders (Corner, Kinicki, & Keats, 1996; 
Walsh & Fahey, 1986), social interactions will be more or less intense. Some actors (in this 
study, core members of the top management team, external creative agency, consultants) enter 
into direct verbal or nonverbal contact; others communicate only in indirect or virtual 
manners (e.g., supporters of core members, such as employees further down the hierarchy and 
market researchers). Contacts are formal or informal (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Mumby & 
Clair, 1997).  
Furthermore, the brand strategy interest group is not homogeneous: Participants play 
different roles, with some more intensely involved than others. In our case study, the top 
management team represented the core members of the brand strategy interest group. 
However, neglecting the role of “peripheral” members (i.e., employees who are not directly 
involved in branding strategies but still provide important inputs) located throughout the 
company would mean disregarding potentially important cocreators of and contributors to the 
ongoing social interaction. For example, selected task forces and UCO champions, across the 
hierarchy, engaged in brand strategy development and played key roles in the social 
interaction process. These employees improved entire processes to become more customer 
oriented, gave feedback to top management of what worked and what did not; UCO 
champions facilitated training and information flow and they served as role models. This team 
was rather cohesive, so members actively participated in the ongoing process.  
The team is a socially relevant stimulus as well. Through value selling–based training, 
members effectively introduced and represented stimuli to fuel and lead the cultural change in 
specific directions and in reaction to employees’ actions. They also participated in 
conversations that influenced how an issue would be understood and enacted (Maitlis, 2005; 
Weick, 2002). For instance, in the production center, the complaint messages of customers 
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were put on the wall. While these messages largely were ignored in the beginning, after a 
while they were picked up by employees as an input to how and where to improve.  
5.3. Brand strategy manifestations 
As part of the brand strategy interaction process, the members of the brand strategy interest 
group socially constructed and created manifestations of the branding strategy. These 
manifestations are both objects of use and simplified representations of the meaning of the 
strategy, presented as signs. Through the use of those signs, members of a strategy interest 
group ascribe ontological reality to their organization (Durkheim, 1994), even if they never 
come in actual contact, as is common for many global companies. Manifestations enable the 
members of an organization to experience the abstract meaning of a brand strategy (e.g., 
Customer Orientation First) by transforming it into more familiar forms of organizational 
reality, such as objects, people, organizational structures, rules of behavior, practices, 
management systems, or resource allocations (Weick, 1985). The manifestations then 
represent the organizational context that surrounds strategically relevant social interactions. 
Some manifestations are typical to the brand strategy and represent stable elements of the 
organization’s internal environment. Others vary depending on the specific situation. In our 
case study, the strategic brand objective was to become more customer focused, and 
management, staff, and external stakeholders worldwide could experience this rather abstract 
concept through a consistent visual design (e.g., signage), the careful development of new 
products and services, or the substantial resources available for employee training and 
education. More peripheral, situation and cultural context–specific manifestations included 
sponsored events and managerial communication.  
6. Conclusions 
We started with an assertion about the continuing need for empirical research that details the 
dynamics of brand strategy formation. By drawing on strategy-as-practice research, we 
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consider the influence of brand actors, beyond the top management team, and offer empirical 
insights into social interactive processes; our findings thus contribute to calls for further 
research in this area (Mühlbacher & Hemetsberger, 2008; Roper & Davies, 2007). In contrast 
with a traditional brand strategy perspective, which tends to find intentional branding 
decisions even where none exist, we investigate the influence of the situational context on 
brand strategy formation.  
6.1. Managerial implications 
The findings give rise to several managerial implications. First, our analysis of the roles that 
the members of a B2B organization perceive for themselves during strategy formation offers a 
better understanding of the interplay among these various actors, who together continuously 
form the strategy. We thus identify the key role of internal communication campaigns for the 
success of brand strategy formation, along with several practices of such campaigns. 
Practitioners thus should recognize that organizational limits are permeable to varying 
extents, depending on the stakeholder context (e.g., capital owners, employees, suppliers, 
consultancies, customers).  
Second, it is critical to observe ongoing brand strategy–relevant interactions in 
organizations, in addition to individual sense-making and sense-giving processes. Doing so 
gives practitioners a better understanding of how branding strategy in a B2B context forms as 
a complex system of knowledge and practices and how it simultaneously influences brand 
strategy through an ongoing discourse.  
Third, the findings underpin the influence that the situational context (i.e., individual, 
business group–specific/organizational, or market-related) has on brand strategy formation.  
Fourth, our discussion of strategy formation, brand strategy formation groups, and brand 
strategy manifestations demonstrates how the formation integrates people who participate in 
the process, the manifestations that make the brand strategy subject to experience, and the 
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situational context into a single, ongoing, recursive, interactive process. Thus brand strategy 
knowledge and manifestations of brand strategy get continuously co-created and co-
constructed; they also are simultaneously implemented. 
6.2. Limitations and further research 
As is the case for most research, our study contains several limitations that affect our 
interpretations and demand consideration; these limitations also suggest directions for further 
research. First, studies of brand strategy formation might be improved by real-time, 
longitudinal analyses, rather than using historical information and interviewee recall. 
Additional studies should examine brand strategy formation as part of a longitudinal, 
participant–observer investigation.  
Second, our study focuses on a European-based organization, which provides a benchmark 
for analyzing brand strategy formation in different countries. Examinations of cross-cultural 
differences in brand strategy formation could help international managers determine whether 
they should adapt their brand strategy formation to different cultures or if a global effort is 
feasible. 
Third, the study context—adding another brand value rather than starting a corporate brand 
from scratch—may limit the transferability of our findings. Further research is needed to 
uncover the full range of possible brand strategy formations required to develop B2B brands. 
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Table 1: Interview sample  
Unit of Analysis 
Function 
HighRingTech: Vibration Control Europe   
1 Chair of the board (active)  
2 Internal communications manager (active) 
3 Director of sales (active) 
4 Logistics manager (passive) 
5 Key account manager (active) 
HighRingTech: Vibration Control America  
1 Internal communications manager (passive) 
2 Director of sales (active) 
3 Product developer in chief (passive) 
Vibratech Europe    
1 
Team coordinator, Ultimate Customer Orientation 
(UCO) (passive) 
2 Sales manager VK 1 (passive) 
3 Sales manager VK 2 (passive) 
4 Worker 1 at production line VK 1 (passive) 
5 Worker 2 at production line VK 1 (passive) 
6 Customer complaint manager (passive) 
7 Worker 1 at production line VK 2 (passive) 
External Consultant    
1 Head of project (active) 
2 Change agent (active) 
Supplier  
1 Key account manager (passive) 
Market research company  
1 Director & key account manager (passive) 
External creative agency  
1 
Project leader (active) 
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Table 2: Interview protocol, topics, and codes for analysis 
Target       Topics / Codes for Analysis 
HighRingTech Employees 
What was the motivation to start with UCO?  Reasons to launch UCO and related aims 
 
What were major challenges throughout this program? Situational contexts, problems associated with the  
What were major obstacles from different areas / people? program 
 
Who were major participants and what was their role? Brand actors and roles, social interaction, 
communication 
 
What were single steps, brand activities, etc?  Brand strategy formation practices 
 
What were moments of success?    Levels of success 
External Consultant, Supplier, Market Research Company, Creative Agency 
What were major challenges throughout this program? Situational contexts, problems associated with the 
What were major obstacles from different areas / people? program 
 
What was your role?  Brand actors and roles, social interactions, 
communication 
 
What were single steps, brand activities, etc.?  Brand strategy formation practices 
 
What were moments of success?    Levels of success 
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Table 3: Criteria for assessing research quality: trustworthiness 
Confirmability → Interviews with knowledgeable 
informants from internal and external to case 
company. Discussions with academic colleagues; 
presentation of research findings at brand marketing 
conference. Two researchers analyzed the collected 
data, as well as tacked between literature and data. 
These efforts expand and refine our interpretation of 
the findings. 
Generality → The number and length of interviews 
uncovered multiple aspects of corporate brand 
strategy formation. 
Credibility → Two researchers set up the research 
and interpreted the findings. All informants were 
invited to provide feedback after the analysis. 
Integrity → Interview questions were nonthreatening 
and allowed informants to present the material in 
their own terms. Thus informants were open about 
the research issues.  
Dependability → The historical development of 
branding was discussed.  
Transferability → We provided background 
information on the case company and located the 
company within its industry sector. We gave 
detailed descriptions of the company’s background 
and brand strategy development. We employed a 
standardized interview protocol, clear procedures for 
data analysis, and a database that offers input for our 
qualitative analysis. 
Fit → The question of whether our findings were in 
line with what we examined was addressed through 
credibility, dependability, and confirmability 
(Beverland, Kates, Lindgreen, & Chung, 2010).    
Understanding → Informants were invited to 
provide feedback on initial interpretations. We 
presented the initial findings at a brand marketing 
conference, inviting colleagues to question our 
findings. 
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Figure 1: Organizational structure of HighRingTech 
Parent Company
HighRingTech
Segment A
Business Groups
Vibration Control
Europe & 
America
Vibratech Europe
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Business Groups
Nonwoven material
Specialities
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Household Products
Research Unit
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Figure 2: Brand champions involved in the UCO transfer process 
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Figure 3: Brand strategy formation and underlying dynamics    
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